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The critical element in Evans' approach is also twofold. He does not agree 
totally with Climacus, and he devotes the final chapter of his book to developing 
his major criticism. But there is a critical element also in those chapters primarily 
devoted to sympathetic interpretation. As someone who speaks with Climacus 
as a fellow philosopher, Evans is sensitive to the kind of objections that thoughtful 
readers (and careless readers) will raise against his point of view. By stating 
these forcefully and then giving the answers Climacus gives or could consistently 
give, Evans generates a kind of philosophical dialogue. And because he has a 
keen sense of the ongoing significance of the issues raised by Climacus, this 
dialogue becomes a conversation with the present and not merely with the past. 
The emergence of a Climacus who is anti-foundationalist without being subjec-
tivist or relativist, who is anti-rationalist without being irrationalist, and who is 
existentialist by means of rigorous concept analysis is a powerful challenge to 
a great deal of contemporary philosophy, theology, and preaching. 
The critique that Evans develops in his final chapter is simply this. In developing 
a much needed assault on the flattening out of human experience in Hegelianism 
and the flattering of bourgeois respectability in Christendom, Climacus overstates 
the gap between the inwardness without which there is no genuine subjectivity, 
no human selfhood, and the outwardness in which it must express itself, however 
incompletely. The subjectivity of soul-making needs to be brought into fuller 
balance with the subjectivity of society-transformation. Evans draws on materials 
from Kierkegaard himself to this end, but wants to go farther than he was ever 
willing to go. But if he wants to go beyond Kierkegaard in this respect, it is not 
because he wants in any way to leave behind the challenge Kierkegaard has left 
us in the writings of Johannes Climacus. 
The Mirror of Language, by Marcia L. Colish. Lincoln & London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1983. 339 pages. 
Reviewed by MARY T. CLARK, Manhattanville College. 
The author examines how four major medieval thinkers-Augustine, Anselm, 
Aquinas, Dante,--<:onsidered signs to function in the acquisition and transmission 
of the knowledge of God. She has placed this sign theory "in the historical 
context of their specific interests, ways ofthinking, and intellectual environment." 
(p. vii) 
The sign theory common to all four thinkers was first explicitly formulated 
by Augustine, a theory of signs as objective and as verbal. The objectivity of 
signs as pointers to realities existing outside the mind and prior to the use of 
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signs was both an Aristotelian and Stoic contribution. But the primarily verbal 
character of signs was influenced by the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son, 
revealed as the Word, God's perfect self-expression. The knowledge of God is 
now made possible by faith in Christ, but since faith comes through hearing, 
the power of speech henceforth participates in the Incarnation by "helping to 
spread the Word to the world." (p. ix) 
It is no accident that this theory should be expressed in the modes of the 
trivium which had helped to fonn their minds, but each one's intellectual envi-
ronment leads to the demonstration of this sign theory in rhetoric by Augustine, 
in grammar by Anselm, in dialectic by Aquinas, in poetry by Dante. 
The author admits that medieval sign theory may not be confined to the 
particular approaches of the four Latin thinkers presented, but the reader must 
also admit that the author has chosen four very representative and influential 
medieval figures. The four demonstrations reveal in addition to a common sign 
theory, the intellectual innovation of each period and the personal interests of 
each thinker within the common concern for an authentic knowledge of God. 
The study is an instance of Gilson's thesis concerning Christian philosophy: 
that Christianity acted as an extrinsic factor in the development of philosophical 
positions, without becoming an intrinsic element of the philosophical argument. 
As the author realizes, Christian thinkers had to grapple with problems not on 
the agenda of classical philosophers. Thus the Stoic conviction that words are 
real entities that naturally signify the physical and metaphysical realities for 
which they stand and the Aristotelian certainty that sensory data lead to a knowl-
edge of prior and nonsensible realities were reinforced by the scriptural assertions 
that God can be known through his creation. Christian faith, held to be the 
nonnative knowledge of God, had been mediated through signs-the Incarnation, 
the preaching of Christ, the teaching of Apostles and theologians. Surely this 
fact predisposed Christians to accept the mediation of all knowledge through 
signs especially verbal ones. Yet faith gave a kind of knowledge which, although 
most certain, was partial, knowledge per speculum in aenigmate. Christians 
distinguished the reflection of God in the mirror of faith from God himself. 
Words as signs of God are instrumental, not heuristic. They lead to an initial 
knowledge of God or a deepened understanding only with God's assistance. The 
author speaks of the first as "indicative" knowledge of God, of the second as 
"commemorative" knowledge. And since it is through redemption by the Incarnate 
Word that men "are enabled to know God and to bear God to each other in 
human words," (p. 26) the author considers that the classical knowledge is now 
redeemed. 
As the originator of medieval sign theory, Augustine is given extensive and 
careful consideration, a section that is rich and rewarding. Colish sees the Con-
fessions as illustrating Augustine'S sign-theory in action, with Augustine reacting 
BOOK REVIEWS 349 
to the spoken words of his friends and his mother and to the written word 
mediating revealed Wisdom, concluding the work with "a schematic outline of 
the various uses of redeemed speech." (p. 30) It is also in the Confessions that 
Augustine recognizes that the Incarnation has changed all nature, including the 
nature of language so that theology is now possible. "Christian eloquence 
becomes, both literally and figuratively, a vessel of the Spirit, bearing the Word 
to mankind, incorporating men into the new covenant of Christ and preparing 
them through its mediation for the face-to-face knowledge of God in the beatific 
vision." (p. 26; cf. Conf 4.11.19) 
It is refreshing to find the author directly interpreting Augustine's statements 
instead of being obsessed to find everywhere the evidence of Neoplatonic influ-
ence. Instead, she sees that "a dynamic relationship between God and man is 
initiated and sustained for Augustine in and through the temporal, material 
conditions of human existence, by virtue of the Incarnation." (pp. 34-35) The 
redeemed sign-theory implies a Christian esteem for life on earth. Augustine's 
meditation on human nature in an effort to discover how we know God culminates 
in his study of memory within which is our knowledge of God. Colish sees this 
memory-theory as Augustine distancing himself from the Platonic view that truth 
pre-exists in the mind from eternity. Learning occurs through language, and to 
sustain what is heard, memory is needed. Otherwise one could never enjoy a 
musical composition. The sustained knowledge of God is happiness because it 
entails a certain permanence. 
Very valuable is the detailed analysis of the De dialectica (accepted as Augus-
tine's work), the De magistro, the De doctrina Christiana. 
As to Anselm who revised Augustine's verbal epistemology by using 11th 
century academic terms, he developed his own technique for deepening faith 
into intellectus fidei in terms of the grammar available to him. She refers to 
Anselm as an intramural theologian. His verbal theory is discussed through an 
analysis of the texts: De grammatico, De veritate, the Monologion, Proslogion, 
and Contra Gaunilonem. 
Commendable is the author's challenge to Anselmian scholars and contempo-
rary logicians to return the so-called ontological argument to the full text of the 
Proslogion and, indeed, to the context of its predecessor, the Monologion if they 
hope to clarify what Anselm is trying to do, that is, give a theological argument 
in the grammatical mode of his day. Only in the light of his intentions and of 
the "meaning he imparts to such terms as truth, necessary reasons, intellectus 
fidei" which he defines elsewhere can the argument for God's existence be 
grasped. Thus "Kant's reading of the Proslogion proof as an 'ontological' argu-
ment imposed a cumbersome new burden of anachronism upon its interpreters." 
(p. 56) Surely she is right in saying that interpreters are "now discussing each 
other's version of the proof' (p. 56) rather than trying to understand Anselm 
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himself. Her explanation of the proof will assist many to do the latter. 
The author's presentation of Thomas Aquinas' theory of signs is gathered 
from many writings since the closest he comes to a formal treatise on signs is 
in his Commentary on the Divine Names of Dionysius the Areopagite. Awareness 
of the need for the negative way of knowing God alerted Aquinas to the limitations 
of all signs leading to the knowledge of God. 
As a theologian who considered demonstration to have no place in a science 
based on faith, Thomas used "dialectic," the finding of probable arguments. 
Theological knowledge will always be knowledge of God in a mirror, darkly. 
To describe him one must use analogy. Corlish provides a good treatment of 
Thomas' use of analogy of attribution (stressing the similarities among analogates 
rather than differences) and his use of analogy of proper proportionality (em-
phasizing the differences between analogates), the former considered more 
Thomistic by Suarez, the latter, by Cajetan. Her failure to see, however, that 
analogy is a metaphysical doctrine mars this presentation. 
The author is more perceptive than many others, however, in her treatment 
of Aquinas' notion of faith which is often reduced to a cognitive content. She 
recognizes that for Thomas "faith" is not merely a revealed metaphysics but "a 
bond between God and man, initiated by God as a gratuitous gift." (De veritate, 
q.14, a. 2). "Faith is addressed to, and has consequences for, the whole man, 
and not just the intellect." (p. 125) Faith requires both grace and freedom. 
"Although faith may become (italics mine) merely intellectual, it is through the 
will, under the influence of grace, that faith achieves its proper form in becoming 
a living faith infused by charity." (p. 125; cf. De veritate, q.14, a. 3. a. 5) 
Reason supplies an extrinsic support for faith. Aquinas teaches that the first 
principles of theology, although undemonstrable, are not opposed to reason. 
Corlish believes that Aquinas rejects Anselm's Pros log ion argument "because 
he is unaware of its nature," since he is using a different conception of "definition" 
from Anselm's grammatical one. (p. 136) The author has incorrectly listed 
Thomas Aquinas' works in the bibliography under the name "Aquinas" instead 
of "Thomas Aquinas." 
Finally, Dante applies Augustine's sign-theory to literature. He develops a 
poetics which aims to teach, to delight, to persuade: a poetics which, in attempting 
to express the Word and to move men toward God through its aesthetic, moral, 
and intellectual rectitude, retains the functional inter-relations between wisdom, 
virtue, and eloquence assigned by Augustine to redeemed speech. 
Dante's poetic theory is synthesized through the minute analysis of the Vita 
nuova, the Convivio, the De vulgari eloquentia, the letter to Can Grande della 
Scala, and the Divine Comedy, while the De Monarchia is reviewed to show 
Dante's political motivation in writing his poetic epic. Like Augustine in the De 
doctrina Christiana, Dante is aware of the four senses in which writings can be 
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understood: the literal, the allegorical, the moral, the anagogic, and he asserts 
that the literal sense should always be established first since the others depend 
upon it. 
Using poetry to apply his sign theory, Dante, like Augustine, has learned 
much of it from the Incarnation. He believes that as a result of the Incarnation 
"concrete, material things, individual persons as moral ends, and earthly beauty 
as objects of authentic aesthetic experience become means by which God chooses 
to descend to man, in and through the conditions of human life." (p. 192) Life 
is transformed from within. So Dante's poetry is said to reflect Augustine's 
redefinition of Cicero's rhetoric, with words as the "basic symbolic intermediaries 
in the process of knowledge," (p. 205) as was God's Word with respect to the 
knowledge of God. 
The author's main insight as to the centrality of the Divine Word in medieval 
verbal theory is summed up in this statement: "The doctrine of the Incarnation 
is a key idea for all the proponents of Augustine's verbal epistemology in the 
Middle Ages, whether, like Augustine and Anselm, they see its implications 
primarily in the redemption of human language and thought processes, or whether, 
as in Aquinas, its implications lie primarily in the realm of natural theology, in 
which Christ functions as the Logos of creation as well as the illuminator of the 
human mind." (p. 206) 
All four thinkers are said to have recognized the power and the limitations of 
words, their role as instruments in the knowledge of God, depending for their 
success on God's power and on the moral condition of the speaker. In their 
theory of signification, being is prior to knowing. Yet the normative knowledge 
of God is knowledge by faith, a moral and intellectual state, a "dynamic condition 
in which the believer moves toward the vision of God, a beatitude which perfects 
the whole man and which transforms all of his human relationships." (p. 222) 
Only when logic developed from the 12th to the 14th century did there come 
a break between reality, thought, and language. Previously, language was the 
key to the "cognition and communication of objective reality." (p. 5) 
Marcia Colish has authored an impressive work of research and interpretation 
highly recommended for all who are interested in sign theory, medieval thought 
and the Christian influence on knowledge. Her incarnational principle is most 
applicable to a theory of knowledge of God which in her Introduction she claims 
to be her central interest. From that point of view, the sub-title of the book is 
misleading: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge. It is also misleading 
because the theories of knowledge of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas are not as 
unified as their theories of language and are not studied in this work. For Aquinas, 
at least, the concept was a sign but a formal sign, identical with its object, not 
an instrumental sign as Corlish asserted that all four thinkers understood a word 
to be. 
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This book is a revised edition of a work published in 1968 and reflects more 
recent scholarship in the area of semiotics. The author is a professor of history. 
Her book is an historian's approach to sign theory. She has produced an admirable 
synthesis of what one prominent theory of signs meant to the Medieval Age. 
Without this work of historical clarification, the philosopher and the theologian 
are not in the best position to interpret what is being stated by these thinkers 
about God, the soul, the world. Undoubtedly certain aspects of this interpretation 
of medieval sign-theory will stimulate controversy among philosophers, theolo-
gians, and literary critics. But the thesis of a "redeemed language" will stimulate 
reflection among Christian thinkers in all fields. No review, however, can do 
justice to the richness of this research and the remarkable perceptiveness of the 
author. This is reason enough to recommend it for personal growth as well as 
for professional development. 
